INTRODUCTION
Throughout the last two decades of the twentieth century, the most dominant discussion in urban scholarship has focused on the role of power, politics, and institutions in shaping urban development, and in particular, fostering uneven development (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom, 2001; Feagin, 1998; Judd and Swanstrom, 1998; Logan and Moloch, 1987; Molotch, 1976; Squires, 1994) . Are neighborhood decline, gentrification, and suburban sprawl the unavoidable outcome of the workings of market forces? Or are those market forces the product of political maneuvering and institutional decision making within powerful organizations? The premise of urban political economy is that urban patterns are not inevitable but can be altered with change in institutional and power arrangements (Squires, 2003 ).
Yet actually shifting power from one group to another is easier said than done. Urban political economy is better at theorizing and documenting the structure of political dominance than showing how it can be modified.
How may community organizations acquire leverage that permits them to alter political decision making around space and urban development? What methods may disenfranchised communities use to get a seat at the policy-making table around housing and community development? How can community-based organizations gain authentic power over things that matter, not simply shift symbolic politics? This article addresses these questions.
This article describes a collaboration designed to begin to alter the politics around policy decisions on blight in Philadelphia. Called "Research for Democracy," this collaboration represents the coupling of research and organizing sophistication that permits the structuring of research as part of community organizing and vice versa. Research is used by leaders to organize. But community organizing also defines the research agenda. Research for Democracy is an attempt to develop a symbiotic relationship between research, organizing, and public policy.
By design, Research for Democracy altered the conventional university research process so that it was actively involved in political organizing. This active involvement in, and partnership with, organizations outside of the university in order to have a direct impact and to affect change is what David Perry of the Great Cities Institute calls "engaged research" (Perry, 2003) . Engaged research is one of the activities occurring in an "engaged university," one where leadership and resources are committed to the task of ensuring ongoing connections between university activities and organizations and institutions within its community environment at the neighborhood, city, or regional level. This article describes the process of conducting engaged research that sought to build the capacity of grassroots community leaders to affect changes in citywide policy.
Research for Democracy's conception of combining research with organizing was not solely about conducting more relevant or useful research per se. By design, Research for Democracy was about the acquisition of power to: (1) obtain a seat at the policymaking table for community leaders to define the blight policy agenda, and (2) alter the conception of fundamental policy issues around the blight problem.
These political goals are represented theoretically as three dimensions of power (Gaventa, 1982; Lukes, 1974) . The first dimension of power represents the ability of groups to prevail over others in a decision-making conflict. The first dimension of power is recognized by the visible appearance of winners and losers.
The second dimension of power, known as non-decision making or agenda setting, represents the mobilization of interests toward considering some issues and not others (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970) . The second dimension of power is recognized by the consideration of the issues of particular groups, and not others, without the appearance of any observable conflict (Gaventa, 1982) .
The third dimension of power is the exercise of influence in shaping the needs, wants, and desires of the powerless. The third dimension shapes the very conceptualization of issues by the powerless; it is what Gramsci termed ideological hegemony (Gramsci, 1973) .
By obtaining a seat at the policy-making table, community leaders would acquire the requisite opportunity to shape the blight policy agenda-the second dimension of power. Altering how blight was fundamentally perceived as a policy issue is the third dimension of power. Establishing credibility as political actors and redefining the blight policy agenda were prerequisites to prevailing politically-the first dimension of power.
Altering blight power relations was a process of promoting an alternative causal theory for the blight problem. Deborah Stone argues that competing definitions of problems can alter political dynamics (Stone, 1997) . These competing definitions emerge out of different causal theories proposed to explain a problem. Proposing that a problem emerges unintentionally, as a product of accidental or natural cause (e.g., economic and demographic forces), supports one type of policy solution while arguing that it is not accidental but due to human agency supports another. The natural causal argument will support policies revolving around the inevitability of blight. A human agency causal argument revolves around the opposite frame of reference-that blight is not inevitable and can be mitigated. This process for telling a credible story about blight and human agency became the work of Research for Democracy.
This article has several parts. The first part describes the Research for Democracy initiative, the organizations and leaders involved in it, and its conceptualization of the research and organizing effort. The second part provides an analysis of the implications of different conceptualizations of blight and describes competing constructions of the blight problem in Philadelphia. The third part describes how research findings were used in the policymaking process. The final part discusses the political outcomes from this effort, lessons learned, and the implications for research, policy, and organizing.
RESEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY
With funding from two Philadelphia-based foundations, Temple University's Center for Public Policy (CPP) and the Eastern Pennsylvania Organizing Project (EPOP) created the Research for Democracy project in September 2000. The purpose of the project was to provide a means for CPP and EPOP to jointly conduct research that would support community organizing aimed at increasing investment and improving the quality of life and education in Philadelphia neighborhoods. Research for Democracy was based on the underlying argument that Philadelphia needed to make its residential neighborhoods more attractive places for families to live in if it were to reverse declining population and resources dating back to 1950.
EPOP is one of approximately 150-175 faith-based community organizations in the United States. These are known as "institution-based" organizations because they represent official organizations of institutional members, not of individual people. As a member of PICO, a network of faith-based community organizations operating in 150 cities and 15 states, EPOP uses an organizing model that brings people together to address neighborhood problems through existing community institutions. In this, it is part of a broader trend in community organizing that has seen a rapid increase in faith-based community organizing efforts across the United States over the past decade and the emergence of these groups as dominant civic organizations in a number of cities (Warren, 2001; Warren and Wood, 2001; Wood, 2002 ) .
One of the defining characteristics of institution-based or faith-based community organizing groups is a highly developed set of methods for community organizing that include research as a central component to leadership development. While staffed with professional organizers, organizations like EPOP see their primary mission as involving large numbers of people in influencing decisions that shape the community. Because EPOP saw research as an integral part of developing community leaders, who often conduct what is referred to as research actions with public officials, it approached Temple University looking for a relationship that would add to the research skills and knowledge of neighborhood residents.
Partnerships between universities and community organizations are not new (Nyden et al., 1997) . In the last few years, the U.S. Department of Housing Development and the Fannie Mae Foundation have provided funding for establishing more sustained collaborations between universities and communities. Much of the genesis for university researchers and community organizations to work together came from joint efforts in work on community reinvestment and discriminatory bank lending practices (Shlay, 1989 (Shlay, ,1993 Squires, 1992) .
EPOP was not interested in a more traditional community-university relationship in which organizations are often the consumers of research produced by the academy, not partners in the design, conception, and production of the research. This was one of the reasons why early on a decision was made to hire permanent staff for Research for Democracy who would see their role as both research and leadership development rather than simply contract with particular faculty to carry out specific research projects. The goal of creating and sustaining a research partnership also defined the research process to be carried out by a joint team of community leaders, CPP staff, and faculty and to make Research for Democracy a place where community leaders involved in improving their local communities could deepen their understanding of research and public policy change.
For EPOP, the Research for Democracy partnership with Temple was meant to help the organization project itself as a credible actor around citywide policy issues. For this reason, Research for Democracy was designed to build the capacity of leaders in EPOP who had worked extensively on neighborhood improvement efforts to develop broader policy proposals based on these experiences. Research aimed at specific neighborhood revitalization efforts would be a spin-off from the main focus of developing research that supported new neighborhood-oriented policies at a citywide level.
Prior to forming Research for Democracy, EPOP had already successfully worked with CPP on several initiatives. CPP helped EPOP prepare two reports on First Union Bank's lending practices in Philadelphia-reports that helped to support organizing activities that resulted in a community reinvestment agreement between EPOP and the bank. The following year, in 1999, it helped the organization carry out a survey about a program that sought to improve city services and policy protection in an area where EPOP worked (Eastern Philadelphia Organizing Project, 1999) . These initial projects reflected the nature of CPP as an applied research organization with a broad set of policy interests. By 2000, CPP was increasingly seeing community partnerships as central to its work and was looking for opportunities to more directly impact public policy in the city and region.
The mutual interests of EPOP and CPP in influencing city policy helped cement the relationship underlying Research for Democracy. This common interest in policy change and the leading role of the community organization in defining the nature of the relationship distinguished Research for Democracy from more typical university-community partnerships. This included EPOP receiving a significant portion of the resources raised to support the research effort. Rather than a more general effort to reach out to and improve the community, CPP entered into a deep partnership with a single organization designed to build the capacity of that organization to effectively represent the interests of a broad constituency in the political arena.
Four basic ideas provided the underlying assumptions on which EPOP and CPP organized the Research for Democracy collaboration. First, research developed in a political organizing context is more likely to address questions of relevance for communities. Second, community leaders can use research to support and provide credibility for policy demands and to provide, sustain, and accelerate organizing efforts. Third, understanding research and research methods is an important ingredient for community leadership development. Fourth, it is possible to conduct rigorous, methodologically sophisticated, and scientifically credible research within a community organizing context.
Issues to be addressed by Research for Democracy came out of EPOP's organizing efforts. With Mayor Street poised to initiate antiblight policy but several months away from providing any specifics on this policy, EPOP leaders chose neighborhood blight and abandonment as their first issue to research. EPOP brought together what the organization called a blight research team that was made up of 15 EPOP clergy and neighborhood leaders all of whom had been active in efforts to improve their local communities. The represented communities ranged from two of the poorest neighborhoods in the city, with extremely high rates of housing abandonment, to more economically stable workingclass and lower middle-class areas that were beginning to see visible signs of blight. The EPOP research team began meeting regularly with CPP researchers to learn research methods and to develop a research design. EPOP leaders interviewed neighbors and fellow church members to develop a set of research questions. These questions focused on the extent of blight in Philadelphia, underlying causes of housing abandonment, the cost of abandonment, and best practices from other cities.
While CPP was primarily responsible for collecting and analyzing large amounts of quantitative and qualitative data, the blight research team continued to meet approximately every other week for a year to guide the research, interpret the results, and develop policy recommendations and strategy. Out of this experience, the team would ultimately become quite adept at communicating complex research findings to policy makers.
CONSTRUCTING THE BLIGHT PROBLEM
How blight is conceptualized and defined has historically been central to the construction of policy designed to respond to it (Gordon, 2004) . Although blight is real in its physical manifestations and its social, economic, and political consequences, blight is a social construct-it is simply an idea. Therefore, what constitutes a blighted community is inherently subjective and subject to social negotiation. It is the political negotiations around the causal theories of blight as well as its definition that became the stuff of Philadelphia blight politics (Stone, 1997).
The term blight was introduced into the federal policy lexicon with the Housing Act of 1949 (Fainstein, 1998) . As part of this legislation, neighborhoods deemed to be blighted areas qualified for urban renewal funding. The legislation, however, did not specifically define blight, largely leaving it up to local discretion.
From the perspective of urban renewal, the blight problem represented land use that impeded downtown expansion. Blight provided a technical legal rationale for land clearance. Although billed as a blight removal policy, urban renewal was not designed to alter the dynamics producing blight; it provided the opportunity for local municipalities to use the concept of blight to open up vacant land for new development. Blight policy in the form of urban renewal became a development tool.
Policy makers ignored the political and institutional origins of blight (Metzger, 2000) . These included federal policies that fueled blight by creating transportation and lending policies that intensified the rate of suburbanization and therefore, reduced demand for housing in urban markets (Downs, 1976 (Downs, , 1999 Jackson, 1985) . These policies combined with racial discrimination, redlining, and Federal Housing Administration (FHA) underwriting scandals escalated problems of abandonment (Bradford, 1979; Massey and Denton, 1993; Squires, 1994; Squires and O'Connor, 2001) .
Instead of being seen as a problem created and enhanced by policies shaping metropolitan development, blight became viewed as a normal market outcome as part of an alleged neighborhood life cycle (Metzger, 2000) . This provided further justification for land clearance and shielded government, financial, and real estate institutions from shouldering the blame.
Housing abandonment became perceived as a phenomenon associated with neighborhoods housing racial and ethnic minorities. As part of the neighborhood life cycle, blight and abandonment grew to be considered a normal market response to neighborhood racial change (Metzger, 2000) .
Early conceptualizations of abandonment also focused on landlord disinvestment. Blight occurred with landlords making economically rational decisions to defer maintenance when rental housing profitability declined (Sternlieb, 1966; Sternlieb and Burchall, 1973) . This focus made landlords the scapegoat while further justifying an absence of policy intervention because of the perceived inevitability (i.e., economic rationality) of blight as a phenomenon.
Conceptualized as a failure of the market, not of the institutions governing it, the blight problem ignored a myriad of factors underlying it. First, it avoided tackling the institutional decisions and interests that created the spatial, political, and economic context in which abandonment and blight occurs (Bartelt, 1977; Dear, 1975; Galster, 1987) . Second, it overlooked that blight is not an all or nothing phenomenon but a process that varies considerably in degree and pace (Accordino and Johnson, 2000; Cohen, 2001; Hiller et. al., 2003) . Abandonment is both a process (disinvesting from property) as well as an outcome (a property for which no one assumes responsibility) (Bartelt, 1998) . Third, blight is not simply a market outcome (inevitable or otherwise); it is itself a market force (Burchell and Listokin, 1981; Greenberg, 1999) . Just as reinvestment can support neighborhood housing markets, disinvestment weakens them (Logan and Moloch, 1987; Squires, 1994) . Table 1 compares how market and policy/institutional conceptualizations of blight lead to divergent policy orientations for solving the blight problem. Seen through a market lens, blight is mitigated through concentrated demolition and vacant land assembly where blight is concentrated and strategically located, a process epitomized by early urban renewal policy. Seen through an institutional lens, blight is combated through tackling incipient blight with targeted grant and lending initiatives geared at strengthening neighborhood housing markets, preserving housing, and preventing blight. Yet as a political tool, the Street administration viewed blight as more narrowly circumscribed. His campaign promise was to raise $250 million through the sale of bonds to clear land for eventual development (Burton, 1999) . Blight represented abandoned housing, but not all abandoned housing. Blight became linked to concentrated abandonment and ultimately to clearance of large parcels for large-scale development. The Street administration conceptualized the blight problem as a market-driven phenomenon, one to be solved with public investment in land acquisition and clearance.
Within several months of becoming mayor ( January, 2001) Street reported that he would "unveil a comprehensive neighborhood transformation initiative that will include policies and programs designed to preserve and restore neighborhood vitality in the face of five decades of profound economic and social change" (Neighborhood Transformation Initiative Website, 2003) . He announced his plan on April 18, 2001, and submitted a proposed ordinance for city council approval to authorize the bond sales shortly thereafter. Passage, however, was delayed for eight months.
RECONSTRUCTING THE BLIGHT PROBLEM EPOP leaders' experience of blight differed significantly from the blight problem addressed by the Mayor's proposed initiative (see Table 1 ). Mayor Street's proposal sought to tackle concentrated blight contained in a small number of neighborhoods with large numbers of abandoned properties in close proximity to each other. But EPOP experienced blight as a widespread phenomenon in a multitude of neighborhoods where abandoned and nonabandoned homes lived side by side. It was the destructive coexistence of incipient blight within their communities that defined the blight problem for EPOP, not abandonment writ large. They wanted to save their neighborhoods, not reclaim and develop new ones from land cleared of yesterday's housing infrastructure.
In its research, Research for Democracy sought to capture the blight reality lived by EPOP. Therefore, the research design focused on three connected elements. First, it addressed the extent and location of abandoned housing. Did the distribution of blight in Philadelphia mirror the blight problem defined by those at the top (concentrated blight) or by EPOP leaders (widespread and diffuse blight)? Second, it addressed what caused the volume of housing abandonment to vary from neighborhood to neighborhood. Was housing abandonment rooted in systemic forces with citywide precipitants or was it idiosyncratic to a few neighborhoods? Third, it addressed the economic effects of housing abandonment. Did housing abandonment hurt local property markets only when it was prevalent or did small amounts of abandonment have detrimental consequences for neighborhood housing markets? Through its research, Research for Democracy focused on documenting the manifestation of housing abandonment throughout the entire city.
To address these questions, Research for Democracy compiled a database containing the location of vacant property at two points in time (1984, (2000) (2001) , structural characteristics of housing units, property tax delinquencies, sheriff sales (of tax delinquent property), housing grants from public agencies, lending records of private financial institutions, structure fire records, and census tract level housing and population data (1990, 2000) . These data were used to assess housing abandonment as a citywide phenomenon.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ABANDONMENT
The analyses of the distribution of abandonment led to three conclusions. First, over time any housing abandonment begot more housing abandonment; areas with small amounts of housing abandonment gained more over time. What characterized abandonment in Philadelphia over time was its continuity and expansion.
Second, housing abandonment exhibited both high levels of concentration as well as widespread dispersion. Heavier concentrations of blight existed in north central and western parts of Philadelphia. Yet abandoned property was a familiar site across much of the Philadelphia landscape. Almost every census tract contained at least one vacant property. Half of all Philadelphia's census tracts contained at least 26 vacant housing structures, at least 20 vacant lots, and at least two vacant commercial properties.
The third set of findings addressed the spread of blight among Philadelphia's city council districts. Showing increases in the level of property abandonment at the city council district level spoke directly to council members' definition of the blight problem within the communities that they represented. City council members were responsible for either approving or coming up with an alternative blight plan.
The analysis of blight at the city council district produced two findings, mirroring other findings but more directly speaking to political interests. First, council districts' share of abandoned property remained relatively constant with blight most heavily concentrated among five out of ten city council districts. But second, the remaining districts with less blight dramatically increased the amount of abandonment in their communities; this represented increases of thousands of abandoned property. This representation of blight as widely dispersed and a problem for everyone went to the heart of the political debate around the new blight policy.
The analyses of the causes of abandonment used multivariate techniques to determine the influence of a range of public and private programmatic and investment activities net of ongoing economic and demographic forces. These analyses predicted the number of abandoned homes at the census tract level.
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They specifically targeted whether the role of policy, as represented by the city programs included as independent variables in the equations, had been effective in curtailing or impeding housing abandonment. Local policy was measured as the number of homes renovated with local private dollars, number of cash grants for housing settlement costs, number of grants for basic systems repairs, number of properties sold in the city tax delinquency sale, and the number of publicly owned vacant properties.
These analyses also were used to assess whether bank lending activity effected variations in the level of housing abandonment. Bank lending activity was measured as the number of single-home-purchase loans made and the percentage of home mortgage applications denied.
The findings pointed to local policy's lackluster success in fighting blight as well as the role of private investment decisions in fomenting it. Each percentage of home mortgage applications that were denied increased the number of abandoned homes. The underlying reasons for these mortgage denials is unknown so it is not possible to assess whether these loan rejections were legitimate or not. Nonetheless, the finding that mortgage denials were a factor that worked to increase abandonment points directly to the influence of private financial institutions' decision making on neighborhood blight.
None of the housing rehabilitation or grant programs influenced the variation in housing abandonment. This indicated, according to Research for Democracy, a failure of strategic targeting of programmatic initiatives to have a measurable (i.e., statistically significant) effect on the blight problem. Arguably, these programs may have provided benefits to some people. But these programs did not alter or affect the magnitude of the blight problem. Moreover, two of the local policy variables had significant, positive effect on the number of abandoned homes; specifically, more city sales of tax delinquent properties and more publicly owned vacant properties meant more abandonment (and vice versa).
These analyses of the causes of abandonment suggested that city policy, up to this point, had failed in halting the spread of blight and at the same time, was complicit in being one of the forces behind blight. With citywide analyses that focused on all Philadelphia neighborhoods, the findings spoke clearly to the role of policy and institutional decision making in both creating and accelerating the blight problem across the entire city, not just in areas with larger pockets of abandonment. Blight was not a manifestation of natural economic forces but was rooted in the decisions of policy makers and their agencies. Research for Democracy offered up an alternative causal theory to the blight political status quo (Stone, 1997).
THE INFLUENCE OF ABANDONMENT ON RESIDENTIAL SALES PRICES
The analyses of the influence of abandonment on house sales prices were used to assess whether the amount of abandonment affected neighborhood housing markets. Did blight have systematic economic effects on residential housing markets or were its effects idiosyncratic to the neighborhoods in which it was most concentrated? These analyses spoke directly to the issue of whether widely dispersed blight had serious economic consequences for the city's housing market and by implication, its fiscal health.
The technique used is known as hedonic analysis. It employs multivariate statistical techniques to assess the independent influence on housing prices of each element of the bundle of housing and neighborhood characteristics believed to influence value (Simons, Quercia, and Maric, 1998) . The variables included in the equation were a range of housing structure characteristics (e.g., total living area), neighborhood characteristics (e.g., change in population), economic characteristics (e.g., loans originated), and sales characteristics (e.g., season of sale).
Abandonment was measured to isolate the effects of concentrated abandonment from those from more widespread vacancies. The analyses focused on the influence of the abandonment presence, proximity, and numbers, specifically: The effects of the distance of abandoned housing (within 150 feet, between 150 and 299 feet, between 300 and 449 feet, between 450 and 600 feet, and greater than 600 feet), the number of abandoned property (commercial, residential, and vacant lots), and the presence of any abandoned property. These effects were estimated in three separate equations.
The findings highlighted that small amounts of abandonment had large, deleterious consequences for house sales prices, which in Philadelphia were already low (mean = $75,520 in 2000). Abandonment proximity was critical; abandoned housing within 450 feet of property (about the size of a typical city block) lowered sales prices in the range of $3,542-7,627, all else equal. The number of abandoned properties on the block brought with it a net loss of $6,869 for one abandoned house up to $11,304 for five abandoned houses. The presence of any abandonment brought with it a net loss of $7,386.
The findings spoke directly to the citywide effects of any abandonment, not just concentrated blight. Abandonment nearby and in any amount created major losses in housing value. Incipient blight that went unabated had deleterious effects on the housing market. Alternatively, preserving neighborhoods and checking blight early on should work to stabilize housing markets and increase housing values. This suggested that blight policy could have a direct role in strengthening neighborhood housing markets on a citywide basis. Neighborhood deterioration was not inevitable. Research for Democracy's causal theory argued that blight policy could avoid the weakening of neighborhood housing markets altogether (Stone, 1997).
USING RESEARCH AND ORGANIZING TO INFLUENCE POLICY
The collaborative research on blight helped leaders in EPOP interpret what they were seeing in their own neighborhoods, reshape the policy changes they were seeking from city government, and, most importantly, to be heard throughout an often chaotic policymaking process. This was not a story simply of research helping organizing reach the corridors of power or of organizing helping to amplify research in the policy debate. Rather it spoke to the strategic use of both research and organizing to intervene in and reshape a political debate.
The decision to focus on city council as the research audience was made to fill a political and informational vacuum that the new city administration had created around its blight strategy. At a packed briefing in city hall, EPOP leaders and CPP staff presented vacant property statistics broken down by council district and an analysis of how widespread vacant housing was throughout the city, including many blocks with just one or two vacant properties (Burton, 2001) .
Presented to the city council at a time when many council members had also been complaining about a lack of information from the administration, the research gave council members a data-rich anchor for raising their own concerns about the design of blight policy. Council members became most agitated by the district-by-district analysis of blight that showed the spreading and increasing rate of abandonment in all districts. As a result EPOP leaders, through Research for Democracy, cemented a relationship with the council president Anna Verna who came to rely on EPOP for research, input, and political support during the following year.
Mayor Street sent his blight legislation to city council the following month. Council President Verna refused to schedule a hearing for the bills to authorize the city to issue up to $250 million in bonds-effectively blocking the initiation of Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (NTI). Her refusal would continue through the fall.
The plan that Mayor Street presented to city council proposed to create market-rate housing, rehabilitate vacant housing, build elderly and special needs housing, encapsulate and demolish property, clean vacant lots, create a land bank, and reform the city's property acquisition and disposition system (Burton and Benson, 2001) . While NTI sought to bring all of the disparate elements of the city's housing and community development efforts under one umbrella, at its heart was a plan to promote market-rate housing by clearing large tracts of land. NTI would shift the focus of public resources toward restructuring heavily blighted areas in order to increase the ability of Philadelphia to attract middle-class residents.
At a political level, the NTI proposal set off a struggle over who would have control over the $250 million in bond proceeds. Institutionally, the mayor wanted as much control as possible over how the proceeds would be spent and city council wanted as much oversight as it could obtain. Some council members including council president Verna argued that they ought to have as much oversight over the bond funds as they would over yearly budget expenditures by each department. The administration countered that it needed to break away from traditional practices that allowed the narrow self-interest of council district people to drive community development strategy.
Beneath this institutional power struggle was a debate over the construction of the blight problem. The Mayor and NTI's definition of the blight problem viewed population loss and the accompanying market forces that produced Philadelphia blight as inevitable. Framing blight as a lack of demand harkened back to days of urban renewal where massive amounts of public money was used for land clearance to encourage downtown development.
Research for Democracy, however, framed the blight problem as the product of city policies. The research showed the abandonment was a citywide problem, not one that could be solved solely through demolition. It showed that city policies had failed to reduce abandonment levels and that the presence of one or two abandoned houses had large negative effects on housing values and ultimately on the city's coffers. Blight was neither inevitable nor uncontrollable. Research for Democracy implicated city policy for exacerbating problems with blight and not constructing effective solutions that met the needs of a variety of neighborhoods. Highlighting the role of city government in fueling blight also came out of EPOP leaders' experiences in trying to obtain tax delinquent and publicly owned land for redevelopment.
The key to understanding the impact of Research for Democracy on the policy-making process rests with how the effort combined research and organizing to heighten and publicize debates over how and where blight funds should be spent. In October 2001, with the mayor and council still at an impasse, Research for Democracy released Blight Free Philadelphia: A Public-Private Strategy to Create and Enhance Neighborhood Value-a report containing the final research, blight plans for each council district, and a set of policy recommendations (Whitman, et al., 2001) .
The proposals in the report represented a significant evolution in EPOP's perspective on blight. The report recommended that more money be spent on property acquisition and development and less on demolition and that city functions be consolidated (including moving responsibility for treating abandoned property from the city department responsible for code enforcement to the agency in charge of community development) in order to increase the likelihood of city policy having a more systematic effect on preventing abandonment.
A new set of proposals stemming from the research that set out an alternative framework for community development policy, built around the creation of blight-free zones throughout the city, was made. These zones would be areas where public investment would be used to stabilize existing neighborhoods around anchor institutions like hospitals or other large employers. In some neighborhoods, land clearance and new construction would be appropriate. The blight-free zone plan envisioned a process in which community organizations and institutional anchors would collaborate as partners to develop and submit proposals for city dollars. The very notion of becoming "blight free" reflected the research finding that the presence of just one or two abandoned houses had significant deleterious effects on housing prices.
Blight Free Philadelphia shared two important things with the NTI design, a focus on stimulating market activity and an interest in changing the status quo model for community development in the city. Yet it diverged significantly in arguing that new tools and strategies should be directed primarily toward stabilizing existing neighborhoods rather than creating new neighborhoods.
Framing blight as a universal problem with a large amount of neighborhood level variation was important to EPOP because its own constituency increasingly represented a broad range of neighborhoods that had traditionally been pitted against each other in competition over scarce resources. Moreover, framing blight more universally reflected EPOP members' experience of blight-not as wholesale abandonment but as persistent incursions of abandonment and decay on a routine basis within the neighborhoods in which they were living, not ones already forsaken by the market. The blight-free Philadelphia research was widely publicized in the city's two major newspapers and contributed to broadening the focus of blight from "bombed out neighborhoods" (the media stereotype of blight) to a generalized problem facing much of the city.
3 Importantly, the analysis of how abandonment had spread between 1984 and 2000 helped demonstrated the interconnectedness of neighborhoods.
Organizing also played an important role in the influence of the blight-free Philadelphia research on policy. Clergy and lay leaders from EPOP met with almost every member of city council during the long debate over blight. They also brought council members to large public meetings in their districts where the blight research was presented and asked them to support a "balanced" approach to dealing with blight. EPOP ultimately provided critical community support and legitimacy to a council president and her allies as they adopted a highly confrontational strategy with the mayor over legislation that sought on its face to improve long-neglected neighborhoods.
Perhaps the most significant impact of the Research for Democracy research was in helping to sharpen what became a very public and lengthy debate over several months about the best way to address blight. EPOP was not able to win this debate conclusively. Yet the length and intensity of the debate to a large degree resulted from EPOP's political use of the research.
In February 2002, two years after John Street took office, council finally passed the NTI bond program. Ultimately reflecting Philadelphia's strong mayor government, the legislation gave most of the control of the bond proceeds to the administration. City council was not able to establish a project review team that would give council as a whole a say in the management of NTI. Nor was it able to require the administration to reorganize city housing agencies before it drew down on the bond proceeds.
At the same time, the final legislation included major changes from the initial proposal including $45 million dollars dedicated to neighborhood stabilization, a cap on money to be spent on demolition, a planning process involving city council, and a new program that proposed to "geographically target preservation."
The process of implementing NTI has been just as messy as the political process around its passage. Despite the large amount of money set aside for demolition, very little actually took place during the first years of NTI (Young, 2003a) . One reason was community opposition to land clearance, especially in districts that were slated to receive the most funds under NTI. Another difficulty was finding contractors interested in bidding on the demolition contracts, as well as community protest over demolition jobs not going to Philadelphia residents and businesses (Young, 2003b) . In contrast, demand for money to acquire property was much higher than expected, meaning that in practice much more money was spent on acquisition and development than demolition that the original budget had envisioned.
In June 2003, tensions over relocations reached a boiling point as hundreds of families descended on city hall to protest the condemnation of their homes (Young, 2003b) . At the same time, through a separate set of protests and negotiations, affordable housing groups were able to force the administration to transfer $10 million in unspent demolition funds to the city's Office of Housing and Community Development for affordable housing production and home repair in the second-year NTI budget (Fleming and Twyman, 2003) . Ironically, in its implementation NTI became more of the neighborhood stabilization and renovation program that EPOP had advocated.
GETTING A SEAT AT THE POLICY-MAKING TABLE: WHAT WAS WON
Echoing Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci and given more modern expression by organizer Saul Alinsky, the Research for Democracy project gave credence to the concept that power is the ability to shape the truth. When the smoke cleared and the NTI began to be implemented, what it had become was different than what was originally conceived. Although not successful in restructuring the city's community development policy, Research for Democracy broadened the definition of blight to include not only areas experiencing devastation but to incorporate communities poised to become the blighted communities in the near future. With research forcefully showing how incipient abandonment grew and with EPOP working the political environment, the focus of NTI made room for projects that would work to improve neighborhood situations, not simply tear them down. In the words of one EPOP leader, "We showed that blight is in every neighborhood. We redefined blight and showed that blight means different things for different people." This represented a critical shift in the concept of what it meant to fight blight in Philadelphia-a shift brought to the table by the Research for Democracy-a partnership of research and community organizing. 4 Ultimately, Research for Democracy shifted the definition of the blight problem (Stone, 1997) .
This was interpreted as a political victory for both EPOP and local government actors. City council representatives believed that the political process gave them a critical edge in shaping blight policy. Political insiders articulated this. According to a key staff person with the council president, Anna Verna, Blight Free Philadelphia provided a very important contribution to the City Council's understanding of the abandoned property crisis in the City. It was the first real research provided to us even before we got good information from our own city agencies. The research helped to shape the Neighborhood Transformation Initiative policy developed by city government leading to a greater role for City Council and insuring a more equitable distribution of resources.
EPOP leaders were able to point to four major changes in Philadelphia's blight strategy as a result of their efforts. First, in the final bill, $45 million was added for neighborhood stabilization-money for property rehabilitation, acquisition, and other improvements. Second, the blight legislation capped expenditures for demolition at $160 million, $30 million less than the original budget proposed by the administration. The third change was an agreement that reinvestment plans and budgets would be developed and approved for each city council district-which operated as a way to institutionalize a citywide approach that was tailored to the needs of individual neighborhoods. The fourth, and perhaps most ambiguous, change was a provision in NTI that created geographically targeted reinvestment projects, using language similar to blight-free zones.
EPOP returned to its neighborhood roots following the NTI compromise. It worked in five neighborhoods to use NTI funds and private investment to develop blight-free zones. While these plans are different, they share an emphasis on neighborhood stabilization.
In the Olney neighborhood in Philadelphia, EPOP teams at two large Catholic churches reached an agreement with a community development corporation to rehabilitate 100 vacant houses, with subsidies from NTI. They also persuaded the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regional office to change its practice of boarding up vacant houses awaiting resale and to create financial incentives for FHA-foreclosed homes to be sold to new homeowners rather than landlords (Fernandez, 2003) .
In South Philadelphia, EPOP is working in a neighborhood adjacent to Center City, where gentrification pressures are threatening the stability of a long-term African American community. There, leaders have negotiated with the Mayor and City Council President to use NTI funds to match a private investment commitment from the movie director M. Night Shyamalan to support a renovation and new construction effort to preserve the neighborhood as a mixed-income, racially integrated community.
While EPOP did not get all of the policy changes it wanted, it was able to move from its local work into the policy arena and return with resources and tools that local leaders could use to improve their neighborhoods. The experience taught leaders involved in EPOP and researchers at CPP a great deal not only about blight, but also about the complex politics of policy change in a postindustrial city.
From the perspective of EPOP leaders, participation in the Research Democracy project brought with it concrete benefits to their neighborhoods, benefits that they could see were directly derived from their efforts to shape NTI. Research for Democracy crafted policy at the city level in ways that were able to leverage varied policy responses in neighborhoods with different issues and problems.
Participation in the Research for Democracy project, however, brought with it more than money and policy neighborhood improvements. Research for Democracy provided a new set of understandings on navigating local politics and acquiring leverage. EPOP leaders saw the benefits accrued from being involved in doing research and using it as part of their strategy, particularly research conducted under the respected auspices of a major research institution, Temple University. One EPOP leader said that he saw "the power of data and research in being respected. It changed how EPOP is seen and added credibility so that we are taken more seriously." Another believed that using the research was crucial in getting access to, and respect from, city council whose members felt shut out of the NTI process and therefore, appreciated getting information, particularly on their own districts.
In addition, the process suggested the possibility for different types of political involvement typically experienced in Philadelphia. Philadelphia politics were largely about "cutting deals" as one leader put it, "not a place where the whole city is serviced." Mayoral political maneuvering generally dealt with individual neighborhoods or council members as a way of building loyalty, thereby dividing neighborhoods from each other rather than allowing them to come together with shared interests and concerns. One leader spoke about the ability to "be part of a political process without becoming partisan."
Studying blight as it played out in distinct ways across the city and crafting a community development strategy to meet the needs of different neighborhoods helped EPOP move from an organization with a set of neighborhood agendas to one with a citywide vision. EPOP was always about going beyond "my" neighborhood to "our" neighborhoods. Yet the Research for Democracy project heightened this understanding because it allowed people to see, as one leader put it, "the connectedness of neighborhoods."
RESEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY AND POWER
How did EPOP gain entry to, acquire leverage over, and ultimately materially shape the blight policy-making process? Three themes are central.
First, Research for Democracy combined research and organizing to redefine and reformulate policy on the blight problem. The synergy that emerged from this combination of research and organizing provided an empirical basis for leaders to tell a credible story about blight and their neighborhoods that became a compelling alternative to city hall's definition of the problem. "Blight Free Philadelphia" was not the traditional applied research effort complete with policy recommendations. It was a tool specifically crafted for moving a policy agenda.
Second, by building Research for Democracy with a university-based partner, EPOP gained a level of research sophistication and knowledge that is at the heart of the academic endeavor that universities represent. Research for Democracy conducted scholarly research that was methodologically defensible. During the course of this organizing effort, neither the methodological rigor nor the credibility of the research was questioned. Leaders also took research skills they learned through the Research for Democracy partnership and used them in other contexts to address neighborhood issues.
Third, Research for Democracy supported a highly democratic and relatively broadbased organizing effort that represented real people's experiences and needs. While EPOP leaders were influenced in significant ways by their relationships with both professional researchers and organizers, they were not figure heads articulating an agenda that was assigned to them. The ideas and themes for BlightFree Philadelphia emerged from the myriad of discussions that accompanied both the organizing around local issues and the research process. Research for Democracy's analysis and policy recommendations around blight resonated with people's experiences and spoke to their interests. This clarity allowed them to cut through the allure of the NTI mystique and seek a material, nonsymbolic outcome in the blight policy-making process.
Connecting research and organizing to be used in a political campaign proved to be key to breaking through some of the hegemonic forces that would have maintained a stronger hold on a more urban renewal like blight policy effort in Philadelphia. EPOP's organizing brought together neighborhood leaders who voiced their experiences in neighborhoods, experiences that ran counter to status quo blight scenario. These articulated, shared, and collected experiences influenced a research strategy that focused on the systematic manifestations of blight. Counter hegemonic voices of leaders were repeated, translated, and amplified in the statistical analyses and spatial patterns documented in Blight Free Philadelphia. Propelling these translated community voices into the political arena through public forums with city council members gave further credence and energy to opposing the mayor's blight plan. Research for Democracy's process of building research and organizing provided legitimacy both internally to the organizing effort and externally, particularly with city council and the media, to not only reshape the blight debate but to have a debate in the first place.
Research for Democracy upset the ideological monopoly on what constituted blight through combining research in organizing as the requisite steps towards breaking the stranglehold on ideas-the third dimension of power. Using statistics, graphs, and computer-based mapping techniques, it thrust these ideas into the political discussion mobilizing consideration of additional strategies around blight-the second dimension. In coalition with city council, particularly with its president, it was able to affect changes in the final piece of legislation-the first dimension of power.
Ultimately, Research for Democracy was able to become a successful universitycommunity collaboration that symbiotically combined research and organizing to shape citywide blight policy -changes unlikely to stem from either organizing or research on their own.
CONCLUSION
Can community organizations shift the balance of power to gain leverage over the real politics of money, land, and real estate development in cities? Part of the answer depends on how communities organize themselves.
Research for Democracy's work on Philadelphia blight politics demonstrates how an institutionalized research partnership can enhance the ability of broad-based community organizations to influence public policy. The collaboration between the EPOP and the Temple University CPP proved successful in three ways. First, Research for Democracy was effective in building a partnership between EPOP and CPP that produced solid organizing and research-activities that became symbiotic. Second, the sophistication of the research methods provided credibility to findings used in the sphere of blight politics. Third, EPOP leaders used the research strategically to reshape the definition of blight from being a problem of a few neighborhoods to a universal problem for all Philadelphia neighborhoods.
This authentic partnership where community leaders' experiences informed the research questions and were voiced in the collective research experience helped to reinforce alternative views on blight and break down the third dimension of power-the ability of those in power to shape the conceptions and ideas of the powerless. Armed with research ammunition that mirrored people's shared experiences, organizers strategically worked with other political actors to reshape the policy agenda around blight and break down the second dimension of power-policy agenda setting. By establishing a partnership with members of city council, EPOP was then able to create a conflict over blight policy.
Without mobilizing ideas and interests that would reformulate conceptualizations of the blight problem, it is possible that no conflict over the proposed city blight plan would have occurred and the status quo (the original blight plan) would have prevailed without dissent. EPOP won a partial political victory in this conflict-a classic win involving the first dimension of power.
This partial victory would have been ephemeral without altering the power dynamics around the third (alternative conceptions of blight) and second dimensions (reshaping the policy agenda) of power. This political process underscores both the role of ideological hegemony in maintaining acquiescence to the status quo as well as the counter hegemonic role of research and organizing in moving off the status quo.
The NTI would have been different without the work of Research for Democracy. NTI incorporated neighborhood planning concepts and oversight into its policy agenda. It capped the amount of money to be spent on demolition. And it included a sizeable amount of money to be spent on neighborhood stabilization and preservation. Of course, these policies cannot unilaterally be attributed to one organization's activities. City council and the mayor's office ultimately decided what would constitute the NTI. The movement, however, to include neighborhood stabilization as part of NTI, came out of the Research for Democracy initiative.
The ultimate impact of Philadelphia's current antiblight efforts may not be known for years. Yet for low-income Philadelphia rocked by decades of continuing neighborhood decay, increasing abandonment, and population loss, the NTI represented a major policy agenda for neighborhoods-an agenda absent from Philadelphia politics for decades. The opportunity for community leaders to participate in shaping that agenda was a critical and unprecedented opportunity. EPOP's success in making its vision for the city central to the public debate points to how sophisticated community organizing and new relationships between scholars and civic leaders can combine to change power equations within cities.
